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Entre clientélisme et intérêt individuel : de l'avantage d'être agent général de France à Madrid (1702-1793)

Abstract : Between 1702 and 1793, a general agent of the Navy and Commerce of France was nominated in Madrid alongside the French ambassador in Spain. This paper analyses how the nomination and career of such an agent –a technician specializing in economic questions– depended on the expectations of the administration that recruited him, but also on the individual and family strategies that this agent was able to deploy. In the first place, I analyze the function’s nepotistic element: the position at the general agency in Madrid was an opportunity for its holder to reactivate personal connections with the Secretary of State of the Navy. Moreover, this agent’s career could not be separated from his family and the social climbing strategies of the social group to which he belonged. Finally, the study highlights the importance of the skills acquired by this agent in the exercise of his function, which was an asset that he was in certain cases able to reactivate later on in his career.
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https://hal-normandie-univ.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02276021
Contributor : Histemé Laboratoire de Recherches <>
Submitted on : Monday, September 2, 2019 - 11:26:25 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, September 19, 2019 - 9:18:59 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-02276021, version 1

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Lloret Sylvain. Entre clientélisme et intérêt individuel : de l'avantage d'être agent général de France à Madrid (1702-1793). Cahiers de la Méditerranée, Centre de la Méditerranée Moderne et Contemporaine (CMMC) - Université de Nice-Sophia Antipolis, 2019, p. 45-56. ⟨hal-02276021⟩

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